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J. W. BROADWATER, 
vs. 
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OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
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DICK VAN TASSELL, 
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JANE DOE SHOOL, his wife, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
* 
STATEMENT OF KIND OF CASE 
Case No. 15319 
This is an action by the Respondent to collect on 
certain promissory notes from the Appellant and to foreclose 
on certain mortgages securing the notes and Appellant's 
Counterclaim claiming an overpayment of monies. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
On April 11, 1977, the case came on regularly for 
Trial in the Second Judicial District Court in Davis County 
before the Honorable J. Duffy Palmer, sitting without a jury, 
Upon the conclusion of testimony, the Judge ruled that the 
Respondent was entitled to Judgment on all of the issues set::: 
in the Complaint, and the Appellant's Counterclaim was 
dismissed with prejudice. That Order was entered on May 16, 
1977 and on May 26, 1977, Appellant made a Motion for a 
New Trial. That Motion was denied by Judge Palmer on June 9, 
1977. On July 8, 1977, Appellant moved for a re-hearing on 
his Motion for a New Trial and that was denied on July 21, 19i 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant requests the Court to reverse the Trial 
Court's decision denying Appellant's Motion for a New Trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The facts of this case are very long and complex, 
but for the purposes of this appeal, can be summarized as foll> 
During a period of time from December 12, 1967 to 
December 1, 1971, Respondent J. w. Broadwater made several 
loans to Appellant, Glen Van Tassell. In exchange for these 
loans, Appellant executed and delivered several promissory 
notes ~o Respondent. Each was secured by a separate mortgage. 
. . epara~ During the course of the dealings, each party kept a s 
· f h · d th 1 The only issue accounting o t e money pai on e oans. 
raised in the Trial Court and the issue that has been aprP 1 · 
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is which accounting is correct. 
Respondent kept his accounting on a check size 
piece of paper written on both sides (Plaintiff's Exhibit D, 
Tr. 11) from this piece of paper, Respondent made summaries 
(Plaintiff's Exhibits D, 0 and N, Tr. 21 & 22). According 
to Respondent's testimony, Exhibit D is a complete record 
of all the money he ever received from the Appellant (Tr. 32). 
Respondent testified that he never gave any receipt to 
the Appellant (Tr. 35). 
Appellant is in the gas station business. It is his 
practice to keep an accounting of his transactions by the use 
of individual receipts. Whenever a customer would come in and 
buy gas or other service station goods or services on credit, 
he would write a ticket in triplicate. He would then give a 
copy to the customer and file the other two copies in his 
records. Appellant claims that when Respondent would come into 
the station, he would buy gas or accessories and charge them, 
then he would ask Appellant if he had any money to pay him on 
the notes. Appellant would get cash out of the till and give 
it to the Respondent and then write it down on Respondent's 
ticket (Tr. 95). Appellant introduced 76 such receipts into 
evidence (some were for gas and money, others were just for 
gas and accessories) (Tr. 97). 
Respondent claims that there is still a total of 
$SJ,640. 68 still due on all the notes. Appellants claim 
that there has been an overpayment. 
~t Trial, Respondent produced a handwriting expert, 
-C'.b"' • who did some analysis of the tickets introduced into 
-3-
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evidence. It was Mr. Grube' s testimony that on Defendant's 
Exhibits 16-21, that Respondent's signature was put on prior to 
the amount of money supposedly received by Respondent. Mr. 
Grube testified that he had examined more than just Defendant's 
Exhibits 16-21, but he could only reach a conclusion on 
Exhibits 16-21 (Tr. 170). Mr. Grube said that he was unable 
to determine the time lapse between the two entries (Tr. 176); 
he also testified that it would be extremely difficult to 
take the ticket out of the machine and then replace the ticket 
back in the machine so that the copies would match 
identically(Tr. 177). 
At the conclusion of the Trial, the Judge delivered 
his ruling from the bench. It was his decision that the 
Respondent's accounting was correct in every detail. In fact, 
he even suggested to the Respondent that he contact the 
County Attorney's Office and ask for a perjury investigation(Tr 
On May 16, 1977, the final Order was entered(Tr. 1391· 
On May 26, 1977, Appellant filed a Motion for a New Trial. 
That Motion was heard on the same day as another part of the 
Trial and was denied. On July 8, 1977, Appellant filed a 
Motion for a Re-Hearing on Defendant's Motion for a New Trial. 
This was denied on July 21, 1977. On July 8, 1977, Appellant 
filed his Notice of Appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE COURT'S DECISION AT TRIAL WAS NOT 
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED. 
-4-
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While it is true that because the Trial was before a 
Judge sitting without a jury, the Judge's decision as a trier 
of fact and law should be given much deferrence, he cannot 
stubbornly ignore and refuse to be guided by credible uncontested 
evidence. DeVas v. Noble,13 Ut.2d 133. 
At Trial, there was one piece of evidence that seems 
to have been ignored by the Judge, Defendant's Exhibit 13. 
Defendant's Exhibit 13 is a receipt that bears the signature 
of the Respondent and indicates that the Respondent received 
$3,000.00 cash from the Appellant on February 15, 1972. This 
exhibit is important for a number of reasons. First, since 
it does not appear on the Respondent's accounting sheet, it 
completely contradicts Respondent's testimony that he did 
not receive any other money from the Appellant. Second, it 
contradicts Respondent's testimony that he received only small 
amounts of money, $500. 00 or less. Third, it supports 
Appellant's contention that he paid large sums of cash to the 
Respondent. In his deposition (Broadwater Deposition, p. 34), 
Respondent denied that he signed Defendant's Exhibit 13. As 
shown from the markings on Defendant's Exhibit 22, Mr. Grube, 
the handwriting expert, checked the signature of some of the 
tickets to determine if they were authentic. Mr. Grube never 
indicated that Respondent's signature on Defendant's Exhibit 13 
was forged. In fact, he did not testify that any of the 
signatures on the 76 tickets were forged. Further, at Trial, 
Respondent would not d · h h · irectly answer whet er or not is 
:v;nature appeared on Exhibit 13. At rrial, when asked to 
-5-
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identify Defendant's Exhibit 13, Respondent answered, "That 
certainly is not my signature, I don't think, it does not 
look like it."(Tr. 54). Later, he said, "I never received a 
nickel and I don't think that's my signature."(Tr. 347). 
In his deposition, he flatly denied that Exhibit 13 was his 
signature. Later he hired a handwriting expert to 
examine the tickets, and at Trial, he was not sure whether or 
not his signature appeared on Exhibit 13. Respondent, being 
aware of Defendant's Exhibit 13, surely had Mr. Grube examine 
it and if Mr. Grube had found it to be a forgery, surely he 
would have so testified. On the other hand, it was Appellant'; 
firm testimony that Mr. Broadwater signed Defendant's 
Exhibit 13(Tr. 105). 
The Judge seemed to place heavy reliance on the 
fact that Mr. Grube testified that on tickets 16-21, the 
amount of money that was supposedly received was written 
after the Respondent's signature. Assuming this to be true, 
it still does not controvert the Appellant's testimony. 
Appellant testified that on several occasions, Mr. Broadwater 
would purchase gas or accessories and then come in and ask 
for some money (Tr. 105-106). on several occasions, he even 
bought the gas or accessories from some other employee and the~ 
came to talk to the Appellant about getting some money on 
the notes. It was Appellant's testimony that all of the 
entries on the tickets were made prior to the tickets being 
taken out of the machine (Tr. 106). It is very possible that 
Respondent could have signed for the gas and received the 
money and just added the amount of money to the already 5 
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Again referring to Mr. Grube' s testimony, he stated that it 
would be almost impossible to put the tickets back into the 
machine so that the white and yellow copies would match. In his 
Motion for a New Trial, Appellant submitted the yellow sheet 
so that the trier of fact could determine if the two copies 
matched. The fact that Respondent's signature was put on 
for the amount shown to have been received is meaningless. The 
only issue that matters is whether the amount received by 
Respondent was on the ticket when the ticket was taken from 
the machine and a copy given to Respondent. Just because 
the signature was put in first does not mean that Respondent 
did not receive and acknowledge the receipt of the money. 
While there were six tickets that the signature appeared to 
have been put on first, there are seventeen tickets, 1-15 and 
67 which purport to be receipts of money received by 
Respondent, which were not challenged by the Respondent. 
Appellant respectfully submits that based on the receipts 
presented by Appellant as evidence at Trial, that the Appellant 
carried his burden or proof and made a prima facie showing that 
he paid a large sum of money to the Respondent. That prima facie 
showing has not been rebutted by Respondent and therefore, 
the ruling of the Trial Court was erroneous. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT'S DENIAL OF APPELLANT'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL WAS ERRONEOUS • 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides 
ln Part, that : 
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Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a New Trial 
may be granted to all or any of the parties and 
all or part of the issues for any of the followion 
. nc 
causes; provided, however, that on a Motion for a· 
New Trial in an action tried without a jnry, the 
Court may open the Judgment, if one was entered 
take additional testimony, amend Findings of Fa~t 
and Conclusions of Law or make new Findings and 
Conclusions and direct the entry of a new .:rudgment: 
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for the 
party making the application which could not, with 
reasonable dilligence have been discovered and 
produced at Trial. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify 
the verdict or other decision or that it is 
against law. 
Appellant's original Motion for a New Trial was 
not property heard. There was never any notice that the Motio: 
was to be heard. The Trial was bifurcated into two hearings, 
one as to the issue of the notes and mortages and the other 
one as to the ownership of the ten foot strip of land surround:: 
the Appellant's service station. The Trial on the notes and 
mortgages was heard first on April 11, 1977. On June 9, 
1977, the second Trial was held(Tr. 405). At that time, the 
Trial Judge sua sponte brought up the Motion for a New Trial 
and sUI1UUarily denied it. Appellant's counsel was not given 
notice to prepare for that hearing and as a result, was not 
given an opportunity to be adequately heard. 
In order to remedy the injustice, Appellant filed a 
Whil'. Motion for a Re-Hearing of the Motion for a New Trial. 
rules of civil procedure do not provide for a Motion for 
re-hearing, the Court should have allowed it on one of r·..;~ 
-8-
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orounds. First, since the Appellant did not have proper notice 
of the original Motion, he should be given an opportunity to 
be heard. Second even if the Motion for re-hearing was improper, 
the requirements 6f Rule 60 were met and the Court should have 
considered the Motion for re-hearing as a Motion for relief 
b 
from Judgment under Rule 60B. In the case of Durrey v. Lunford, 
18 ut. 2d 74, 4J.5 P2d 662, the Court in holding that the motion 
to reconsider a denial of a new trial was improper, said: 
The rules of civil procedure do not provide for a 
motion to reconsider or review its ruling g£anting 
or denying a motion for a new trial and where the 
requirements of Rule 60 are not met, the Court 
has not the authority to entertain or grant a 
motion to reconsider. · 
In the present case, the requirements of Rule 60 were met and 
thus, the Court did have authority to hear and grant Appellant's 
second Motion. Rule 60b provides in part that: 
The Court may in the furtherance of justice, 
relieve a party or his legal representative from 
a final Judgment, Order or proceeding for the 
following reasons(l) mistake, inadvertance, surprise 
or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due dilligence could not have been 
discovered in time to move for a new trial 
under 59B; ... 
As to item (1) in Rule 60 (b), since the Court brought the 
original Motion for a New Trial sua sponte without notice in 
advance of the hearing, Appellant did not have the opportunity 
to adequately prepare for that hearing and as a result, was 
truly surprised and any neglect on his part should be excused. 
This being the case, i tern ( 2) clearly applies in that the 
'·
2 \·rly discovered evidence could not have been presented timely 
·c, '·
1
" 
2 n ?inal Motion for a New Trial, since Appellant was not 
-9-
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was not informed of the time of hearing. It is the Appellant', 
position that the Motion for re-hearing on the Defendant's 
motion for a new trial was justified. 
In ruling on a Motion for a New Trial, the Trial Jue~; 
decision should be given much deferrence. King v. Union Paci[: 
Railroad Co., 117 Ut. 40, 212 P2d 692. But again the Judge 
cannot be allowed to 11 stubbornly ignore and re fuse to be guided 
by credible, uncontradicted evidence when all reasonable minds 
would accept it. 11 DeVas v. Noble, supra at 137. The primary 
concern of the Court in deciding whether to grant a new trial 
on the basis of newly discovered evidence is that justice 
be done. Crellin v. Thomas, 122 Ut. 122, 247 P2d 264. If the 
Judge finds that on the basis of the newly discovered evidence 
that there is a reasonable likelihood that the resti.lt would be 
different, he should grant a new trial. See Browers v. Gray, 
99 Ut. 336, 106 P2d 765; Saltas v. Affleck, 99 Ut. 381, 105 P2i. 
Jensen v. Logan City, 89 Ut. 347, 57 P2c 708. In the present 
case, there were three pieces of newly discovered evidence 
presented in Appellant's Motion for a New Trial that were 
uncontested and concousively show that Respondent's accountinq 
was incomplete. ~· Check from Appellant to Respondent dated 
March 20, 1970. In his second motion for a new trial, Appellai:: 
submitted as newly discovered evidence a check dated March 20, 
1970 from Appellant to Respondent for $100.00 ( R. 442). ThlS 
exhibit was submitted and was not challenged by Respondent and 
the check was endorsed by the Respondent. The check does not 
appear on Respondent's accounting slip (Plaintiff's Exhibit D' 
In his testimony, Respondent stated that all the money he 
-10-
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received from Appellant was listed on his accounting slip, but 
this check shows conclusively that the accounting is not 
totally correct. ~. Affidayits of Erma Van Tassell and Ronald 
Ditrnar (R . 445, R . 451). At Trial, Ronald Ditmar testified 
that he was present at five or six times when he saw Appellant 
give Respondent some cash (Tr. 75). He further testified 
that on another occasion, he took several checks from the till 
and from Mr. Van Tassell's wallet up to the bank to obtain 
cash and after he returned with that cash, he saw Appellant 
give that cash to Respondent (Tr. 77-78). At Trial, Mr. Ditmar 
was somewhat hazy on when the events took place and how money 
was transferred. After the Trial, Mr. Di tmar was reminded by 
Appellant's wife of a specific time when she was sent up to 
the bank to get $2,000.00. When she returned and counted out 
the money, there was only $1,900.00 and Mr. Ditmar was called 
in to count the money and verify whether there was $1,900.00 
or $2,000.00. In his Affidavit, Mr. Ditmar states because of 
this being brought to his attention, his memory was refreshed 
and that in fact, this event did not t.;i.ke place and the $1,900.00 
was given to Respondent ( R. 452) • This testimony was never 
contradicted by Respondent which is important for three 
reasons. First, it shows that Respondent was not willing to 
accept checks from Mr. Van Tassell, but rather insisted on cash. 
Secondly, again, this $1,900.00 does not appear on the Respondent's 
accounting slip, Exhibit D. Again showing that Respondent's 
accounting was not totally correct. Thirdly, it directly 
~ort-ra<'icts R 
·- " espondent's testimony that he never received 
0 
r,ercL· .J"e: $500.00. £.. Check from Appellant's wife 
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wife to Respondent dated November 16, 1969. Along with Erma 
Van Tassell' s Affidavit ( R . 445), was submitted a copy of 
a check for $200.00 dated November 11, 1969 from Erma Van 
Tassell to Respondent. This check was also endorsed by 
Respondent. Again the check does not appear on Respondent's 
accounting slip and again conclusively shows that Respondent's 
accounting was not totally correct. 
CONCLUSION i 
The Trial Judge placed too much reliance on the exper:I 
testimony of Mr. Grube and as a result was led to believe that : 
Mr. Van Tassell had perjured himself. As a result of this 
belief, he failed to consider properly the uncontraverted, 
newly discovered evidence presented by Appellant on his 
motions for a new trial. Appellant respectfully submits that 
the Trial Judge erred in failing to grant Appellant a New Trial.I 
Respectfully Submitted, ' 
FULLMER & HARDING 
BY 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I delivered two copies of the : 
fo r Respondent, ,! Appellants' Brief to Allen H. Tibbals, Attorney 
salt Lai' 
Suite 400, Chancellor Building, 220 South Second East, 
City, Utah 8411 on this 30th day of September, 1977. 
. /) 
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